Decisions under risk have been shown to differ depending on whether information on outcomes and probabilities is gleaned from symbolic descriptions or gathered through experience. To some extent, this description-experience gap is due to sampling error in experience-based choice. Analyses with cumulative prospect theory (CPT), investigating to what extent the gap is also driven by differences in people's subjective representations of outcome and probability information (taking into account sampling error), have produced mixed results. We improve on previous analyses of description-based and experiencebased choices by taking advantage of both a within-subjects design and a hierarchical Bayesian implementation of CPT. This approach allows us to capture both the differences and the within-person stability of individuals' subjective representations across the two modes of learning about choice options. Relative to decisions from description, decisions from experience showed reduced sensitivity to probabilities and increased sensitivity to outcomes. For some CPT parameters, individual differences were relatively stable across modes of learning. Our results suggest that outcome and probability information translate into systematically different subjective representations in description-versus experience-based choice. At the same time, both types of decisions seem to tap into the same individual-level regularities.
Introduction
For centuries, students of probability, rationality, and decision theory have employed choices between monetary lotteries as the paradigmatic tool for investigating normative and descriptive aspects of human decision making (Hacking, 1990) . A typical approach is to present respondents with lotteries in which all outcomes and their probabilities are numerically or symbolically described. People are asked to choose, for example, between a sure option offering $3 and a risky option offering an 80% chance of $4, otherwise nothing. An extensive body of work employing such decisions from description has led to the discovery of numerous robust choice regularities (e.g., the Allais paradox and the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes; for reviews, see Luce, 2000; Wakker, 2010) .
However, explicit descriptions of risks and rewards are the exception to the rule in more realistic settings. For instance, when people decide whether to go on a date, to jaywalk, or to put off backing up their computer for another day, they have to rely on their experience about potential outcomes and their likelihoods, because no tabulated risk information is available. Interestingly, recent research has shown that choices differ systematically depending on whether people learn about possible outcomes and their probabilities from experience (decisions from experience) or from symbolic descriptions (decisions from description). In other words, there is a description-experience gap (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004) . One cause of this gap is that people making decisions from experience typically draw only a rather small number of samples before making a choice. As a consequence, rare events are often underrepresented in the experienced samples (and the experienced probability is thus even smaller than the objective one) and people basing their choices on such small samples behave as if they underweight rare events (Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hertwig et al., 2004) . However, the description-experience gap persists (although diminished) when sampling error is taken into account (e.g., when the over-and underweighting of an event is defined relative to its actually experienced probability) and when http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.08.020 0010-0277/Ó 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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